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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1984 the President's Commission on Organized Crime1 con-
cluded that money laundering2 was the lifeblood of organized crime.'
The Commission found that drug traffickers and racketeers exploited
weaknesses in the Bank Secrecy Act 4 to launder much of their income,
1. President Ronald Reagan established the Commission by Executive Order 12435 on July
28, 1983. The Executive Order empowered the Commission to analyze the nature and extent of
organized crime, to discover the sources of its income and the ways in which the income is spent,
to evaluate the effectiveness of current laws and procedures, and to recommend administrative and
legislative improvements. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, INTERIM REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATrORNEY GENERAL 2, THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS, AND MONEY LAUNDERING (Oct. 1984) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT].
2. Money laundering is "the process by which one conceals the existence, illegal source, or
illegal application of income, and then disguises that income to make it appear legitimate." IN-
TERIM REPORT, supra note 1, at 7.
3. Letter from Irving R. Kaufman, Chairman of the President's Commission on Organized
Crime, to President Ronald Reagan (Oct. 1984), reprinted in INTERIM REPORT, supra note 1, at iii.
4. The Bank Secrecy Act is the principal means by which government controls money laun-
dering. See Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat.
1114 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5323 (Supp. IV 1986)).
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estimated by one source to be 150 billion dollars annually.5 In response,
the Commission recommended legislation to strengthen currency re-
porting laws, to extend the investigative powers of federal agencies, and
to create a new money laundering offense.' This new legislation would
hold criminally liable persons who conduct a monetary transaction with
knowledge or reason to know that the funds involved were derived from
unlawful activity.7 The Commission intended the offense to reach those
who perform "ministerial duties"8 necessary for money laundering, but
the broad language of the proposed legislation threatened anyone who
received and banked money derived from illegal activities.
The broad reach of the Commission's offense had ample precedent
in laws proscribing the receipt of stolen property. The crime of receiv-
ing stolen property typically imposes liability on anyone who knowingly
receives property belonging to another with an intent to conceal it from
the true owner; the crime does not require complicity in the underlying
theft.' Despite this precedent, the National Association of Criminal De-
fense Lawyers (NACDL) vociferously opposed the new legislation, argu-
ing that the money laundering offense would expose innocent people to
5. In introducing money laundering legislation, Senator Strom Thurmond adopted an esti-
mate by the Wall Street Journal that illegal drugs, gambling, and vice generate $150 billion annu-
ally. See 132 CONG. REC. S9626 (daily ed. July 24, 1986). Representative William Hughes estimates
the income of drug trafficking alone to be $130 billion annually. See Forfeiture Portions of the
Comprehensive Crime Bill and the Antidrug Abuse Act of 1986: Hearings Before the House Sub-
comm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1987) [hereinafter
Forfeiture Hearings 1987]. That figure, however, is considerably higher than the $50 to $75 billion
estimated by the President's Commission on Organized Crime. See INTERM REPORT, supra note 1,
at 13.
6. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 1, at 58-82.
7. Id. at 67.
8. Money Laundering Legislation: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 106 (1986) [hereinafter Money Laundering Hearings] (remarks of James D.
Harmon, Jr., Executive Director and Chief Counsel, President's Commission on Organized Crime)
(stating that "those responsible for more ministerial duties (such as the picking up or delivery of
the funds being laundered) may not know all the details of their clients' activities, but are highly
likely to be exposed to information that gives them actual knowledge (or reason to know) the true
nature or source of the funds they are laundering").
9. 76 C.J.S. Receiving Stolen Goods § 1 (1952). The new money laundering offense is a vari-
ant of the crime of receiving stolen property. Under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, §§ 301-323, 98 Stat. 2040 (1984) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1963 and adding 21 U.S.C. §
853), the government claims title to illegally derived property at the time of the offense. Anyone
receiving illegally derived property, therefore, receives property belonging to the government. The
Seventh Circuit used this analysis in Roma v. United States, 53 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1931), to
uphold the conviction of a defendant under a receiving stolen property statute. In Roma the gov-
ernment attached 99 sacks of whiskey pursuant to the National Prohibition Act. The defendant
received the stolen whiskey prior to the entry of the order for forfeiture. Relying on United States
v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1 (1889), the court found that the government possessed title to the whiskey
before entry of the forfeiture order and, therefore, the defendant had received stolen public prop-
erty. Roma, 53 F.2d at 1009.
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criminal liability. 10 The NACDL was particularly concerned about the
potential liability of attorneys who receive tainted funds from clients.
The NACDL argued that the in terrorem effect of the statute on law-
yers would deprive defendants of their right to counsel of choice, crip-
ple the adversary system, and radically change the criminal bar." These
arguments did not persuade the United States Congress. A version of
the Commission's proposed offense passed the House and Senate in Oc-
tober 1986 and was enacted as section 195712 of the Money Laundering
Control Act of 1986.18
This Note considers whether attorneys should be prosecuted under
section 1957 for knowingly receiving tainted, bona fide attorneys' fees.
It concludes that prosecution would serve the public interest in certain
cases. Part II discusses the statute, its legislative history, and congres-
sional intent. Part III considers the constitutionality of the statute as
applied to bona fide attorneys' fees. Part IV considers the policy impli-
cations of including bona fide fees within the ambit of section 1957.
Part V discusses the proposed policy of the Justice Department for sec-
tion 1957 and revisions to that policy offered by the American Bar As-
sociation (ABA) and the NACDL. Finally, Part VI recommends to
Congress an amendment to section 1957 that would accommodate the
interests of both criminal defendants and the government.
II. THE SCOPE OF SECTION 1957
A. Section 1957
The Money Laundering Control Act contains two new offenses.
Section 1956, entitled "Laundering of monetary instruments," prohibits
anyone from engaging in financial transactions involving the proceeds
of specified unlawful activity, with intent to promote that activity, and
with knowledge that the transaction is designed to conceal the nature,
source, or ownership of the proceeds.4 Section 1957, entitled "Engaging
in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful
activity," does not require an intent to promote money laundering. 15
10. The NACDL registered its opposition when the new offense was introduced in both the
House and the Senate. See HR. REP. No. 855, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1986); Money Laundering
Hearings, supra note 8, at 123-25, 130-44. The House included the new offense with modifications
in its version of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986. See H.R. REP. No. 855, supra, at 1-2.
The Senate did not include the offense at all. See S. REP. No. 433, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1986).
11. Money Laundering Hearings, supra note 8, at 134-37.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (Supp. IV 1986).
13. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, §§ 1351-1367, 100 Stat.
3207-3218.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (Supp. IV 1986).
15. Section 1957(a) provides in part:
Whoever ... knowingly engages or attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in crimi-
19881 845
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The statute imposes criminal penalties16 on anyone who knowingly en-
gages in a monetary transaction 17 in criminally derived property, 8 when
the property is worth more than 10,000 dollars and is derived from
specified unlawful activity.19
Congress intended the knowledge requirement of section 1957 to
have a "narrow and unusually limited meaning."20 Although knowledge
nally derived property that is of a value greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified
unlawful activity.. . shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).
18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
16. Section 1957(b) states:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the punishment for an offense under this section is a
fine under title 18, United States Code, or imprisonment for not more than ten years or both.
(2) The court may impose an alternate fine to that imposable under paragraph (1) of not
more than twice the amount of the criminally derived property involved in the transaction.
18 U.S.C. § 1957(b)(1), (2) (Supp. IV 1986).
17. According to § 1957(f)(1):
[Tihe term "monetary transaction" means the deposit, withdrawal, transfer, or exchange, in
or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of funds or a monetary instrument (as defined for
the purposes of subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31) by, through, or to a financial institu-
tion (as defined in section 5312 of title 31) ..
18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
The NACDL buttresses its argument that § 1957 exposes innocent people to liability by focus-
ing on the word "withdrawal." The NACDL posits a person who innocently receives and banks
tainted funds and subsequently learns that the funds were illegally derived. In the view of the
NACDL, the statute will prevent the depositor from making any withdrawal over $10,000 from the
account because he now has knowledge of the source of the tainted money. Forfeiture Hearings
1987, supra note 5, at 219-22; Wallace, Money Laundering: The Case for Repeal of the 'Receiving
and Depositing' Offense, at 10 (NACDL Jan. 17, 1987) (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Law
Review). While facially appealing, this argument is probably a chimera. First, the argument is
unclear about how one could possess actual knowledge that the withdrawn money is tainted, as
long as the account contained both legitimate and illegally derived money-unless, of course, the
withdrawal exceeded the amount of legitimate money in the account. Second, one who withdraws
money to give to the government or to hold in escrow for the true owner probably would not be
liable. Consider the crime of receiving stolen property. Courts infer a criminal intent from statutes
proscribing the receipt of stolen property. To possess criminal intent the receiver must intend to
benefit himself, to aid the thief, or to deprive the true owner of the property. 76 C.J.S. Receiving
Stolen Goods § 9 (1952). Because § 1957 is a variant of the crime of receiving stolen property, see
supra note 9, a court likely would require the same criminal intent.
18. Section 1957(c) provides:
In a prosecution for an offense under this section, the Government is not required to prove
the defendant knew that the offense from which the criminally derived property was derived
was specified unlawful activity.
[T]he term 'criminally derived property' means any property constituting, or derived
from, proceeds obtained from a criminal offense..
18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
19. "[T]he term 'specified unlawful activity' has the meaning given that term in section 1956
of this title." 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(3) (Supp. IV 1986). Section 1956 defines the term to include
racketeering as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(a), criminal activity involving controlled substances,
and any of the particular activities listed in § 1956, ranging from offenses involving concealment of
assets and false oaths to criminal violations of the Trading with the Enemy Act.
20. 132 CONG. REc. E3821, E3828 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1986) (statements of Reps. Bill McCollum
and William Hughes).
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of circumstantial evidence might satisfy the scienter requirement,21
mere suspicion that the money is illegally derived or that the person
involved is a criminal does not suffice. 2 A defendant must have actual
knowledge of, or be willfully blind to, the illegal derivation of the
money. 3
B. Legislative History and Intent
Section 1957 contained an exemption for bona fide attorneys' fees2
until ten days before the President signed the Money Laundering Con-
trol Act 5 into law. Representative Bill McCollum first proposed the ex-
emption during the markup of House Bill 5077,26 an early version of the
statute considered by the House Subcommittee on Crime. Representa-
tive McCollum, and other members of the Subcommittee, argued that
exposing defense attorneys to prosecution for accepting bona fide,
tainted legal fees would chill the attorney-client relationship, interfere
with the attorney-client privilege, and deprive defendants of their right
to representation. Representatives opposed to the exemption argued
21. Representative Bill McCollum has argued that a grocer who accepts money from a cus-
tomer, knowing him to be a reputed drug dealer without a legitimate source of income, has knowl-
edge within the meaning of § 1957. 132 CONG. REC. E3821 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1986) (citing Markup
by the Subcomm. on Crime of H.R. 5077, Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, July 16, 1986,
transcript at 11-14 [hereinafter Markup of H.R. 5077]).
22. 132 CONG. REc. S16921 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statements of Sens. Thurmond and
DeConcini).
23. Although the willful blindness standard is not mentioned in the legislative history of
§ 1957, it explains a finding of knowledge in a hypothetical posed by Representative McCollum,
supra note 21. In addition, the legislative history to § 1956 of the Money Laundering Control Act
indicates that Congress intended "knowing" in that section to include willful blindness. See S. REP'.
No. 433, supra note 10, at 9-10. Willful blindness is "a mental state in which the defendant is
aware that the fact in question is highly probable but consciously avoids enlightenment." United
States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976).
24. The exemption was inserted at the end of paragraph (a) and read: "This paragraph does
not apply to financial transactions involving the bona fide fees an attorney accepts for representing
a client in a criminal investigation or any proceeding arising therefrom." H.R. REP. No. 855, supra
note 10, at 1.
25. The President signed the Money Laundering Control Act on October 27, 1987 as part of
Pub. L. No. 99-570.
26. H.R. 5077, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
27. Representative Bill McCollum argued: "I am concerned, as you are, I have been for some
time, about the impact our statute might have on chilling the relationships between a defense
attorney in a criminal proceeding and his client." Markup of H.R. 5077, supra note 21, at 5, quoted
in Report to the House of Delegates No. 11OA, NBA. SEC. CRiam. JUST. 8 (1986) [hereinafter ABA
REPORT].
Representative William Hughes, chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime, also argued in favor
of the exemption:
We certainly don't want the statute to be so broad we either chill the relationship between
defense attorneys and their clients or that, in fact, we expose defense attorneys in receiving
fees to possible criminal prosecution where they have not participated in any way in a crimi-
nal offense either in the underlying participation in the criminally derived property or the
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that prosecution of attorneys in some cases might be necessary to fight
a "growing persistent crime."28 After long debate, the Subcommittee
adopted the exemption because of concern for the statute's impact on
the right to effective assistance of counsel. The Subcommittee believed
that, without the exemption, attorneys would fail to investigate fully
their clients' cases in order to avoid learning the source of their fees. 29
The attorneys' fee exemption remained in the Money Laundering
Control Act when it was introduced in the House as part of as the Om-
nibus Drug Enforcement, Education, and Control Act of 1986.30 The
Omnibus bill passed the House twice before being amended and
renamed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.3' The attorneys' fee exemp-
attempt to conceal or launder those funds.
Markup of H.R. 5077, supra note 21, at 5, quoted in ABA REPORT, supra, at 8. Representative
Daniel E. Lungren also recognized a chilling effect on the attorney client relationship:
Unfortunately, we find ourselves with attorneys being in a very different situation, and I
think there is a chilling effect here. * * * ... I think the Defense Bar has made a good
argument; in fact, the chilling effect would be that the attorney would not want to know the
facts that are within the mind of the person he or she is representing, because if he or she
knows that, they might find out they can't accept any of the financial benefits here.
Markup of H.R. 5077, supra note 21, at 5, quoted in ABA REPORT, supra, at 9. Representative
Bruce Morrison also favored the exemption: "I don't have the problem in creating an exception for
the attorney, I think the attorney-client privilege and the right to representation under the Sixth
Amendment is important enough... "Markup of H.R. 5077, supra note 21, at 19, quoted in ABA
REPORT, supra, at 9-10.
28. For example, Representative Romano Mazzoli argued:
I think that we are here to try to fight a growing persistent crime, we are trying to fight this
conspiracy of violence, and conspiracy of action in which unfortunately some lawyers have
been involved, and if there is a need for section 1, I think it should be applicable across the
board.
Markup of H.R. 5077, supra note 21, at 15, quoted in Supplemental Brief for the United States at
5-6, United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd on rehearing sub nom. United
States v. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc) [hereinafter Sup-
plemental Brief].
Representative Clay Shaw also argued against the attorneys' fee exemption:
Now this is not an indictment of the Criminal Bar, but it is an indictment of an ongoing
relationship between drug dealers and a single lawyer that seems to go on and on and on. And
to make the monies that are paid as bona fide fees for this particular lawyer as an exemption
when he probably, more than anyone else, should bear responsibility for knowingly taking
these funds I think would be a very bad mistake, and I would hope this committee would not
accept that.
Markup of H.R. 5077, supra note 21, at 22, quoted in Supplemental Brief, supra, at 6.
29. 132 CONG. REc. E3822, E3828 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1986) (statements of Reps. McCollum
and Hughes); H.R. REP. No. 855, supra note 10, at 14.
30. See H.R. 5077, supra note 26. After incorporating the amendment into H.R. 5077, the
Subcommittee on Crime reported the bill as a clean bill and reintroduced it as H.R. 5217. The
House Judiciary Committee approved H.R. 5217 on July 29, 1986, and referred it to the Banking
Committee. The Banking Committee discharged the bill on September 26, 1986. See 1985-1986
Cong. Index (CCH) 35,095. Language identical to H.R. 5217 was introduced on September 8, 1986
as part of H.R. 5484, entitled the "Omnibus Drug Enforcement, Education, and Control Act of
1986."
31. The House passed the Omnibus bill on September 11 and October 8, 1986. See 1985-1986
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tion, however, was one of more than 1200 sections in the Omnibus bill
and received no consideration during the floor debates.2
Congress dropped the attorneys' fee exemption"3 from the Omnibus
bill during a late-night conference to resolve differences between House
and Senate versions of the bill.3 4 Representatives Bill McCollum and
William Hughes, attendees at the conference, note in the Congressional
Record that the conferees favored the policy behind the exemption. 5
The conferees, however, were reluctant to favor the attorney-client rela-
tionship when other situations also might warrant special treatment.3 6
As the hour grew late, the difficulty of redrafting section 1957 and the
unlikelihood that attorneys would be prosecuted convinced the confer-
ees to leave the issue of statutory exemptions to a later Congress. 7 The
Congressmen's remarks show that the conferees understood statutory
exemptions to lie within Congress' province; the conferees did not in-
tend exemptions to be inferred by the courts. Thus, the plain language
of the statute and the legislative history indicate that section 1957 en-
compasses bona fide attorneys' fees.38
Cong. Index (CCH) 35,101-02.
32. For a list of the debates on the Omnibus Drug Enforcement, Education and Control Act
of 1986, see CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICES, CIS ANNUAL 1986 LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES OF
U.S. PUBLIC LAWS 578-79, Items 4.4-4.19 (1987) (relating to Pub. L. No. 99-570 debate). The first
mention of the attorneys' fee exemption does not occur in the Congressional Record until almost
three weeks after Congress passed the Money Laundering Control Act. See 132 CONG. REC. E3821,
E3827 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1986) (statements of Reps. McCollum and Hughes).
33. A congressional source familiar with the conference has indicated that the exemption was
dropped at the insistence of Senator Joseph Biden. The comments of Representatives McCollum
and Hughes in Forfeiture Hearings 1987, supra note 5, at 232-33 confirm this information.
34. See generally 132 CONG. REC. E3821-22, E3827-28 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1986) (statements of
Reps. McCollum and Hughes); Forfeiture Hearings 1987, supra note 5, at 196-97, 232-33. The
conference occurred in the Speaker's dining room and was described by two attendees as "bizarre."
Id. at 233. Major participants at the conference included House Majority Leader Jim Wright; Mi-
nority Leader Robert Michel; Chairman Rangel of the Senate Select Committee on Narcotics
Abuse and Control; Congressmen Rodino, Hughes, McCollum, Lungren, and Shaw of the House
Judiciary Committee; and Senators Biden, Hawkins, Hatch, Chiles, DeConcini, Moynihan, and
D'Amato. The conference also included members of the following House committees: Foreign Af-
fairs, Armed Services, Ways and Means, Merchant Marines and Fisheries, Banking, Public Works,
Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, Post Office and Civil Service, Interior, Government
Operations, and Rules. Letter from House Majority Leader Jim Wright to Author (Jan. 11, 1988).
35. 132 CONG. REC. E3822, E3828 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1986) (statements of Reps. McCollum
and Hughes). Whether the Congressmen spoke for all the conferees on this point is unclear, be-




38. The clear language of a statute controls in the absence of "clearly expressed legislative
intent to the contrary." United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (quoting Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)); see also N. SINGER, STAT-
UTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.04 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1984). The courts' handling of attor-
neys' fee forfeitures under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (Supp. IV 1986)
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF SECTION 1957
Since the passage of section 1957, both the ABA and NACDL have
called on Congress to amend the statute.3 9 These groups argue that sec-
tion 1957 threatens an attorney with prosecution for the legitimate rep-
resentation of a defendant. 40 The ABA and NACDL also contend that
and 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (Supp. IV 1986) illustrates how courts might interpret § 1957. Section
853 (c) states:
All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) of this section vests in the
United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeit4re under this section. Any
such property that is subsequently transferred to a person other than the defendant may be
the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter shall be ordered forfeited to the
United States, unless the transferee establishes in a hearing pursuant to subsection (n) of this
section that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of such property who at the time of purchase
was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture under this
section.
21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (Supp. IV 1986). Section 1963(c) contains substantially the same language. Al-
though § 853(c) contains no attorneys' fee exemption and its legislative history is ambiguous, most
early decisions hold that the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act does not reach bona fide attorneys'
fees. These courts reasoned that Congress could not have intended the forfeiture of attorneys' fees
because forfeiture would violate the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel. In effect, these
courts inferred a specific intent to exempt attorneys' fees from Congress' general intent to avoid
violations of the sixth amendment right to counsel. See United States v. Ianniello, 644 F. Supp.
452 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Md. 1986), aff'd on other
grounds sub nom. United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987) (rejecting the district
court's interpretation of legislative history); United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D.
Va. 1986), afl'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987)
(rejecting the district court's interpretation of legislative history), rev'd on rehearing sub nom.
United States v. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (decided on
constitutional grounds); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y 1985); United
States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985).
Recent circuit court decisions, however, reject this approach and uphold the constitutionality
of attorneys' fee forfeiture. See United States v. Nichols, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 3043 (10th Cir.
1988) (overruling Rogers sub silentio); United States v. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d
637 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (overruling Reckmeyer explicitly and Bassett sub silentio); United
States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1987) (rehearing granted en banc) (overruling Ianniello
and Badalamenti sub silentio) (rehearing granted en banc); see also Brickey, Forfeiture of Attor-
neys' Fees: The Impact of RICO and CCE Forfeitures on the Right to Counsel, 72 VA. L. REv. 493,
499-503 (1986). The Fifth Circuit interprets the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act to extend only to
sham transfers of attorneys' fees, allowing an attorney who has received a bona fide fee to avoid
forfeiture. See United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463 (5th Cir. 1986). The persuasiveness of Thier
on other circuits, and on the Fifth Circuit itself, is suspect. Thier relied heavily on Bassett, Ian-
niello, Reckmeyer, Badalamenti, and Rogers, each of which has been rejected by the appellate
court in its circuit. Also, while Thier still binds the Fifth Circuit, the concurrence to a recent Fifth
Circuit decision indicates a preference for the reasoning of Caplin & Drysdale. See United States
v. Jones, 837 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1988) (Davis, J., concurring).
39. See Forfeiture Hearings 1987, supra note 5, at 217-22 (statement of Bruce M. Lyons,
President, NACDL); ABA REPORT, supra note 27. The ABA and the NACDL also have lobbied the
Justice Department to support a statutory exemption for bona fide attorneys' fees. See Letter from
Albert J. Krieger, Chairperson of the Dialogue with the Justice Department Committee (NACDL),
and David Rudolph (ABA) to William Weld, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Jus-
tice (Nov. 7, 1987) [hereinafter Letter] (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
40. Letter, supra note 39.
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the threat of prosecution potentially impairs a defendant's sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and to counsel of
choice, strains the relationship between attorney and client, and dis-
courages private attorneys from defending suspected drug dealers.41
These arguments also have been raised against statutes that threaten
the forfeiture of attorneys' fees. 42 Like section 1957, attorneys' fee for-
feiture statutes may penalize an attorney for accepting illegally derived
money in payment of a bona fide fee. Because section 1957 and the
attorneys' fee forfeiture statutes potentially impair a defendant's rights
in the same manner, this Note will explore the constitutionality of sec-
tion 1957 by reference to cases involving the forfeiture of attorneys'
fees.
A. Constitutionality of Attorneys' Fee Forfeiture
The forfeiture of a defendant's assets is authorized by the Compre-
hensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 (CFA). 8 Under this Act, the government
claims title to property obtained in violation of the Racketeering Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 44 and the Continuing
Criminal Enterprise Act.4 Title vests at the time of the offense, not at
the time of conviction." The government may prevent the dissolution
of property by obtaining a pretrial restraining order4 7 and by seeking
the forfeiture of property transferred to a third party.48 Third party
transferees may defeat forfeiture if they can show that they were bona
fide purchasers for value who took without notice of the government's
claim.49 This asset forfeiture provision has constitutional ramifications
when assets subject to forfeiture have been transferred to an attorney
in payment of a bona fide fee.
41. ABA REPORT, supra note 27, at 3, 7.
42. See infra notes 43-123 and accompanying text.
43. Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 301-323, 98 Stat. 2040 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1963 and adding 21
U.S.C. § 853).
44. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
45. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
46. See supra note 38 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 853(c)). The ABA argues that the government
cannot acquire title until after conviction because criminal forfeiture is punishment, and the gov-
ernment may not punish a defendant until after conviction. See Forfeiture Hearings 1987, supra
note 5, at 86, 97-99. This argument has not prevailed in the courts. See, e.g., United States v.
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc); United States v. Monsanto,
836 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1987) (rehearing granted en banc); United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798,
801 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1011 (1986).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d) (Supp. IV 1987); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (Supp. IV 1987).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d) (Supp. IV 1987); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (Supp. IV 1987); see supra note
38 and accompanying text.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d) (Supp. IV 1987); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (Supp. IV 1987).
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1. United States v. Harvey
United States v. Harvey5" was one of the first cases to reach the
constitutional merits of attorneys' fee forfeiture. 51 In Harvey the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit consolidated appeals
from three district courts: United States v. Harvey,52 United States v.
Reckmeyer,5' and United States v. Bassett.5 4 Each of these cases raises
the issue of whether the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act is constitu-
tional. In the first district court case a pretrial restraining order ren-
dered the defendant indigent, and the court appointed counsel. The
defendant was convicted and appealed.5 In Reckmeyer and Bassett the
court issued the restraining order, but exempted attorneys' fees from
forfeiture. The government appealed the orders in both cases. 6
After finding that the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act encompassed
attorneys' fees,57 the Fourth Circuit turned to the constitutionality of
the Act. The court identified the following constitutional rights possibly
violated by the CFA: (1) the sixth amendment right to some counsel;
(2) the sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel and
the fifth amendment right to a fair trial; and, (3) the sixth amendment
right to counsel of choice.58 These claims are considered in turn.
The sixth amendment guarantees a right to the effective assistance
of counsel in a criminal prosecution,59 which necessarily includes the
right to representation by some counsel.60 Opponents of attorneys' fee
forfeiture argue that the mere threat of a restraining order on a defend-
ant's assets effectively denies him counsel by deterring private counsel
from accepting a case, without rendering the defendant indigent and
eligible for court-appointed representation. 1 Under the Criminal Jus-
50. 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987).
51. Several district courts previously had considered the constitutionality of fee forfeiture,
but avoided a holding based on constitutional grounds by finding that the forfeiture provisions did
not encompass attorneys' fees. See, e.g., United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 138 (D. Md. 1986);
United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191, (E.D. Va. 1986); United States v. Badalamenti, 614
F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985).
52. The district court did not publish a decision in this case.
53. 631 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Va. 1986).
54. 632 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Md. 1986).
55. Harvey, 814 F.2d at 912-13.
56. Id. at 911-12.
57. Id. at 913-18.
58. Id. at 921-22.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall en-
joy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense").
60. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
61. Attorneys' Fee Forfeiture: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 228-29 (1986) (statement of Edward F. Marek, on behalf of the Federal Public
Defenders and the Federal Community Defenders) [hereinafter Forfeiture Hearings 19861; Brief
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tice Act,6 2 only defendants who can show that they are financially una-
ble to retain counsel are eligible for appointed representation. 3 A
defendant could not argue that his assets might be forfeitable, and thus
unavailable for attorneys' fees, without incriminating himself by divulg-
ing the source or utilization of the assets. If the defendant declines to
incriminate himself, opponents argue, he will stand trial without coun-
sel. 4 Two district courts have accepted this argument in dicta. 5
The Harvey court rejected this argument without extensive discus-
sion. " The court reasoned that while a defendant might be denied
counsel in an individual case, such a possibility could not lead to a find-
ing that the Act is facially unconstitutional. One commentator has ar-
gued that this possibility could never exist. In her view, the threat of a
restraining order would not prevent a defendant from showing that he
was financially unable to retain counsel, and in fact never has forced a
defendant to trial without counsel. 7
The Fourth Circuit also recognized the possibility that forfeiture of
attorneys' fees might impair the sixth amendment right to the effective
assistance of counsel and the fifth amendment right to a fair trial. Pri-
vate or appointed counsel must be effective to ensure that a prosecutor
proves his case before an impartial tribunal,68 and generally to ensure a
fair trial. 9 Amici curiae in Harvey argued that fee forfeiture violated
these guarantees by engendering conflicts of interest between a pri-
vately retained attorney and his client.70 Defense counsel's interests will
conflict with his client's if the prosecution offers a plea bargain requir-
Amicus Curiae for the N.Y. Criminal Bar Ass'n at 18, United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th
Cir. 1987) (Nos. 86-5069, 5025, 5050), rev'd sub nom. on rehearing, United States v. Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
63. Id. at § 3006A(a).
64. Forfeiture Hearings 1986, supra note 61, at 229-30 (statement of Edward Marek).
65. See United States v. Ianniello, 644 F. Supp. 452, 456-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v.
Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Ianniello and Badalamenti effectively have
been overruled by United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that the Com-
prehensive Forfeiture Act did not violate the sixth amendment) (rehearing granted en banc).
66. Harvey, 814 F.2d at 922.
67. Brickey, Attorneys' Fee Forfeitures: On Defining "What" and "When" and Distinguish-
ing "Ought" from "Is", 36 EMoRY L.J. 761, 768-69 (1987).
68. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
69. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973).
70. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Am. Bar Ass'n at 18-19, Harvey, 814 F.2d 905; Brief Amicus
Curiae of the N.Y. Criminal Bar Ass'n, supra note 61, at 9-12. The Supreme Court has noted that
conflicts of interest pose risks to the effective assistance of counsel. See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S.
261, 271 (1981) (stating "[w]here a constitutional right to counsel exists, our Sixth Amendment
cases hold that there is a correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest"
(citation omitted)); see also United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308, 1326 n.5 (D. Md. 1986);
United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191, 1197 (E.D. Va. 1986); United States v. Ianniello,
649 F. Supp 452, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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ing the forfeiture of attorneys' fees. A conflict of interest also arises
when defense counsel is subpoenaed to testify about the source and
amount of fees or when counsel testifies in a post-trial hearing to show
that he was a bona fide purchaser. While such testimony is not covered
by the attorney-client privilege, 1 it chills the confidential relationship
between attorney and client. Finally, when an attorney accepts a case in
which his fees depend on the outcome, he violates an ethical rule
against accepting a contingent fee in a criminal case.72
Although court-appointed attorneys may avoid these conflicts be-
cause they are not paid with forfeitable money, amici curiae in Harvey
maintained that the appointment of counsel also threatens the right to
effective assistance of counsel.73 Appointed counsel is not available until
the initiation of formal adversary proceedings, 74 which gives the prose-
cution a substantial advantage in gathering information prior to indict-
ment. 5 Moreover, the quality of appointed representation also is
impaired by the low compensation paid to private counsel under the
Criminal Justice Act.76 Compensation mandated by the Criminal Jus-
tice Act routinely falls below private rates7 7 and has not kept pace with
the rising cost of living.78 Inadequate funding also handicaps the assis-
tance offered by federal public defenders. The complexity of RICO and
Continuing Criminal Enterprise Act cases demands more attorneys and
71. Client identity and fee information are not protected by the attorney-client privilege.
See, e.g., In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Ousterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1983);
In re Slaughter, 694 F.2d 1258 (11th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 631 F.2d 17 (3d
Cir. 1980); United States v. Strahl, 590 F. 2d 10 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 918 (1979);
United States v. Haddad, 527 F.2d 537 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 974 (1976); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975).
72. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(d) (1984) (stating that a "lawyer
shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect. . . a contingent fee for representing a
defendant in a criminal case"); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSILITY DR 2-106 (1981).
73. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Am. Bar Ass'n, supra note 70, at 19-22.
74. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986); United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180
(1984).
75. Forfeiture Hearings 1986, supra note 61, at 231-33 (statement of Edward Marek).
76. Counsel for appellant Harvey argued that low Criminal Justice Act (CJA) rates pre-
vented him from hiring "back-up staff, paralegals and the like" although, for obvious reasons, he
did not argue his counsel was ineffective. Brief for Appellants at 27 n.18, Harvey, 814 F.2d 905.
Counsel did argue, however, that low CJA rates left "the defense plan in shambles, with no real
hope of mounting any semblance of an adversarial position to the juggernaut of prosecution." Brief
for Appellants, supra, at 10.
77. The CJA currently authorizes a maximum compensation of $3500 for each attorney in
cases in which one or more felonies are charged and up to $2500 for representation in an appellate
court. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(3) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). An empirical study by the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York found that private attorneys' fees in Racketeering Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and Continuing Criminal Enterprises Act cases routinely ex-
ceeded CJA rates. See United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1987) (mentioning study)
(rehearing granted en banc).
78. Forfeiture Hearings 1986, supra note 61, at 235 (statement of Edward Marek).
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more time than federal defender offices can provide while adequately
handling other cases."
The Harvey court also disposed of these arguments without much
discussion." The court noted that conflicts of interest and inadequate
resources for appointed counsel will not occur in all cases. Counsel can
avoid a conflict of interest by taking a case pro bono or at Criminal
Justice Act rates. The defendant also may find assets not subject to
forfeiture and retain private counsel. Thus, the Comprehensive Forfei-
ture Act does not violate the right to effective assistance of counsel on
its face. Any constitutional challenge alleging ineffective representation
must be made after conviction."'
The Harvey court, however, did hold that the CFA violates the
right to counsel of choice. 2 Under the sixth amendment, a defendant
has the qualified right to retain counsel of choice" from his own private
resources.8 ' This right is qualified, however, by a public interest in the
fair, orderly, and efficient administration of justice.85 Courts have re-
fused to honor a defendant's choice of counsel because of counsel's mis-
conduct or failure to be admitted to the local bar,6 conflict with a court
79. Id. at 236-37.
80. Harvey, 814 F.2d at 922.
81. Id.; cf. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365-67 (1981); Communist Party v. Sub-
versive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 71 (1961) (citation omitted) (finding that "potential
impairment of constitutional rights under a statute does not itself create a justiciable controversy
in which the nature and extent of those rights may be litigated"). For a complete discussion of
deferring sixth amendment claims, see Brickey, supra note 38, at 529-38.
82. Harvey, 814 F.2d at 923-27.
83. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932) (stating that "a defendant should be afforded a
fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice"). Although Powell established only the right
to counsel of choice in capital cases, generally it is cited for the proposition that the right to
counsel of choice is guaranteed by the sixth amendment. See, e.g., Harvey, 814 F.2d at 923; United
States v. Cicale, 691 F.2d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1082 (1983); Linton v.
Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 208 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982); United States v.
Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979); United States v.
Dinitz, 538 F.2d 1214, 1219 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104 (1977); United States v.
Inman, 483 F.2d 738, 739-40 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 988 (1974). See generally
Brickey, supra note 38, at 506-22.
The qualified right to counsel of choice is rooted in the importance of the "basic trust between
counsel and client, which is the cornerstone of the adversary system," Linton, 656 F.2d at 209, and
defendant's "right to decide, within limits, the type of defense he wishes to mount," United States
v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), and
Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972)). The right, however, does not guarantee a" 'meaningful'
relationship between an accused and his counsel." Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983) (footnote
omitted).
84. See Burton, 584 F.2d at 488-89; Inman, 483 F.2d at 739-40.
85. United States v. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc);
Urquhart v. Lockhart, 726 F.2d 1316, 1319 (8th Cir. 1984); Burton, 584 F.2d at 489; Gandy v.
Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1323 (5th Cir. 1978).
86. See, e.g., Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979); Dinitz, 538 F.2d at 1219-22; Ross v.
Reda, 510 F.2d 1172, 1173 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1985).
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imposed schedule,8 7 or a conflict of interest.8 8 In addition, defendants
may not receive counsel of choice if an attorney is unwilling to take the
case or because the defendant is unable to pay the attorney's fee.
The government argued in its brief that the Act did not violate the
qualified right to counsel of choice for two reasons. 9 First, the accused
is responsible for his inability to retain counsel of choice because the
defendant's own conduct provided the government with probable cause
to restrain the defendant's assets. In this way, the restraining order is
analogous to the pendency of tax assessments or liens issued at govern-
ment request, which do not violate the sixth amendment.90 Second, the
government contended that a legitimate public interest in forfeiture
outweighs the defendant's qualified right to counsel of choice.9 1 Con-
gress intended by the CFA to strip drug traffickers of the assets used to
continue their criminal enterprises, to deter future criminal conduct,
and to ensure that the public received the proceeds of illegal conduct.
92
An exemption for bona fide attorneys' fees would make fraudulent
transfers more difficult to detect93 and deprive the public of assets to
which it is entitled by statute. The exemption also would appear to give
special treatment to drug traffickers and racketeers because no statu-
tory exemption prohibits the state from restraining stolen property held
87. See, e.g., Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983); Cicale, 691 F.2d at 106-07; Inman, 483 F.2d
at 740.
88. See, e.g., United States v. James, 708 F.2d 40, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v.
Vargar-Martinez, 569 F.2d 1102, 1104 (9th Cir. 1978).
89. Brief for the United States at 34-44, Harvey, 814 F.2d 905.
90. The government relied on United States v. Brodson, 241 F.2d 107 (7th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957), for this proposition. In Brodson the government made a jeopardy
tax assessment and filed tax liens against the defendant prior to indictment for tax evasion. The
defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the jeopardy assessment and tax
liens prevented him from retaining an accountant to aid in his defense. The defendant claimed
that, without an accountant, he would be denied a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel. The
district court dismissed the indictment. Id. at 108.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that a determi-
nation of harm to the defendant in advance of conviction was purely speculative because he had
not shown that an accountant was necessary for his defense, that one could not be retained using
other funds, or that he would be convicted. Id. at 110. Because the effect of the jeopardy assess-
ments and tax liens was uncertain, the court reinstated the indictment. Id. at 111. The reason for
the defendant's injury-the government action-did not affect the court's constitutional analysis.
Id.
91. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 69 (finding due process denied only if a court "were arbitrarily to
refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him"); United States v. Flana-
gan, 679 F.2d 1072, 1075 (3d Cir. 1982) (stating that the protection of fifth and sixth amendments
"goes no further than preventing arbitrary dismissal of the chosen attorney, and providing a fair
opportunity to secure counsel of [defendant's] choice"), rev'd on other grounds, 465 U.S. 259
(1984).
92. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 191, 191-93, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3374, 3374-76.




The government offered other arguments during Senate hearings
95
on the forfeiture of attorneys' fees. Forfeiture prevents criminals from
enjoying the fruits of their illegal activity, including the services of an
expensive private attorney.96 Forfeiture also helps the government se-
cure witnesses against drug and racketeering leaders. 97 The government
argued that leaders of criminal enterprises frequently provide "work-
ers" with legal representation to discourage them from accepting a plea
that would require testimony against the organization. 8 Thus, forfei-
ture of attorneys' fees would discourage this conduct while facilitating
prosecution of racketeers and drug traffickers.
The Harvey court found that a defendant's interest in counsel of
choice and effective representation outweighs any interest in forfei-
ture.99 The court reasoned that since sixth amendment guarantees pro-
tect the guilty as well as the innocent, the framers of the amendment
must have assumed that illegally derived money would be used to pay
counsel. The court termed this reasoning "a traditional working as-
sumption within the legal profession." 10 0 The framers also must have
intended for counsel to be sufficiently informed to provide an effective
defense, an intent that the court found was emasculated by the Com-
prehensive Forfeiture Act.101
According to the three judge panel, deprivations of counsel under
the CFA are fundamentally different from other deprivations cited by
the government. Although a conflict of interest or the unwillingness of
counsel to accept a case may deprive a defendant of particular counsel,
the defendant still may choose another attorney. A restraining order
94. The government may restrain stolen property in order to hold it for the true owner. Id.
at 38.
95. Forfeiture Hearings 1986, supra note 61, at 36 (Letter from the Office of the Asst. Att'y
Gen. to Sen. Strom Thurmond (July 7, 1986)).
96. Id.; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 2, 1985, 605 F. Supp.
839, 850 n.14 (S.D.N.Y.) (noting that "[flees paid to attorneys cannot become a safe harbor from
forfeiture of the profits of illegal enterprises. In the same manner that a defendant cannot obtain a
Rolls-Royce with the fruits of a crime, he cannot be permitted to obtain the services of the Rolls-
Royce of attorneys from those same tainted funds"), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.
1985).
97. Forfeiture Hearings 1986, supra note 61 at 36.
98. This practice was detailed in Staff of the President's Commission on Organized Crime,
Materials on Ethical Issues for Lawyers Involved With Organized Crime Cases (1985) (unpub-
lished) (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review). The paper summarizes five case studies of
"mob-connected" lawyers published in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE IMPACT' ORGANIZED CRIME TODAY 221-49 (1986)
[hereinafter THE IMPACT].
99. 814 F.2d at 924.




cuts off all choice.102 Court imposed schedules may deprive a defendant
of chosen counsel, but only when he is at fault for delaying the selection
of counsel for some period of time. A restraining order deprives a de-
fendant of chosen counsel irrespective of his efforts to retain private
counsel. 03 The government may deprive a thief of chosen counsel by
restraining stolen property in his possession in order to preserve that
property for the true owner. The CFA reaches property that belongs to
the accused.10 4 The court also distinguished jeopardy tax assessments
on the ground that these assessments reach property to which the gov-
ernment has a claim before criminal conduct is charged.10 5 Finally, the
court dismissed the argument that a defendant is to blame for his indi-
gency as "border[ing] on sophistry" because the sixth amendment guar-
antees the assistance of counsel to the guilty as well as the innocent.
0 6
The Harvey court thus found the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act uncon-
stitutional to the extent that it authorizes restraining orders and for-
feitures that deny a defendant the ability to pay bona fide attorneys'
fees.
2. United States v. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered
The government petitioned for a rehearing of Harvey before the
entire Fourth Circuit, styling the case as United States v. Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered.07 The court granted a rehearing of the case and
reversed. The decision considered each of the constitutional arguments
discussed by the three judge panel: the right to some counsel, the right
to effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial, and the right to coun-
sel of choice. The court dismissed the argument that a defendant might
be deprived entirely of counsel as unrealistic. 0 8 Although the Criminal
Justice Act requires that a defendant be financially unable before being
appointed counsel, no defendant can be forced to trial without counsel.
The court, however, declined to speculate how counsel would be pro-
vided. The court also considered whether conflicts of interest,





107. 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc). The government did not seek rehearing of the
decision regarding defendants Harvey and Bassett. The Fourth Circuit found that defendant Har-
vey was not denied his chosen counsel. The court did find that defendant Bassett was denied
chosen counsel but the government decided not to appeal because the case had been in the pretrial
stage for a lengthy period of time. Petition of the United States for Rehearing with Suggestion for
Rehearing en banc at 1 n.1 United States v. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir.
1988) (en banc).
108. Id. at 643.
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prosecutorial misconduct, or inadequately prepared appointed counsel
always would result from the forfeiture act. Like the three judge panel,
the court found such results speculative and best handled on a case by
case basis. 09
The Fourth Circuit, however, differed with the panel's resolution of
the counsel of choice issue. The Harvey court found that the presump-
tion of innocence and a defendant's interest in the attorney-client rela-
tionship outweigh the government's interest in forfeiture. The court in
Caplin & Drysdale declined to balance these interests at all. 1"' The
right to chosen counsel belongs only to those with legitimate assets.,,,
Defendants without assets or with insufficient assets must accept ap-
pointed counsel or the private counsel they can afford. Consequently, a
creditor's lien or jeopardy tax assessments levied by the government
may prevent a defendant from retaining counsel of choice without vio-
lating the sixth amendment."1
2
The Fourth Circuit rejected the Harvey court's distinction between
restraining suspected stolen property and restraining suspected racke-
teering proceeds. The Harvey court maintained that in the case of sto-
len property, the property is manifestly that of someone other than the
accused. In the case of suspected racketeering proceeds, on the other
hand, the accused has the superior claim to the funds. The court in
Caplin & Drysdale disputed both contentions." 3 The court noted that
stolen property need not bear the markings of its true owner and em-
phasized that the government has superior title to racketeering pro-
ceeds under the relation-back provisions of the Comprehensive
Forfeiture Act. 14 Because the government has apparent title to prop-
erty restrained under the CFA, the restraining order does not abridge
the qualified right to counsel of choice.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit rejected the Harvey court's reliance on
the presumption of innocence before conviction. The Caplin & Drys-
dale court argued that although the presumption of innocence is critical
in assigning the burden of proof, it is not a grant of immunity from
pretrial inconvenience." 5 Like pretrial detention to prevent the escape
109. Id. at 646-47; see also United States v. Nichols, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 3043, at 69-76
(10th Cir. 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, U.S. App. file).
110. Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d at 644.
111. Id.; see also Nichols, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 3043, at 64-69.
112. Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d at 645-46. The court cited in support United States v.
Marshall, 526 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 923 (1976); United States v. Brod-
son, 241 F.2d 107 (7th Cir.) (see discussion supra note 90), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957); and
United States v. Stevedoring Corp., 138 F. Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
113. Id. at 645-46.
114. Id.; see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
115. Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d at 643; see also Nichols, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 3043, at 47
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of a defendant, a restraining order on forfeitable assets prevents disso-
lution of those assets prior to conviction.
3. Second and Tenth Circuit Decisions
The Second and Tenth Circuits similarly reject the Harvey analysis
and uphold the constitutionality of attorneys' fee forfeiture. The Sec-
ond Circuit in United States v. Monsanto11 6 and the Tenth Circuit in
United States v. Nichols1 7 rooted their analyses in the premise that a
defendant has a right to retain chosen counsel only from his own re-
sources. Because the government has title to illegally derived property
under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act," 8 the courts considered
whether the government may constitutionally restrain assets intended
for attorneys' fees prior to adjudication of the government's claim. The
Monsanto and Nichols courts answered affirmatively. In passing the
CFA, Congress determined that pretrial restraint of assets was neces-
sary to deprive drug traffickers and racketeers of the benefits of organ-
ized crime.11 9 One of those benefits, according to the Monsanto and
Nichols courts, is the services of a private attorney.120 So long as the
government puts forward sufficient proof of its claim, an order re-
straining assets earmarked for attorneys' fees suffers no constitutional
defect.1 21
B. Impact of Attorneys' Fee Forfeiture Cases on Section 1957
Analysis
Constitutional analysis of section 1957 likely would track the
courts' analyses of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act. Both statutes
(citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 532-33 (1979)).
116. 836 F.2d 74 (2d. Cir. 1987) (rehearing granted en banc).
117. 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 3043 (10th Cir. 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, U.S. App. file).
118. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. The Nichols court compared the govern-
ment's regulatory interest in pretrial restraint of assets to the government's interest in pretrial
restraint of a defendant and the requirement that a defendant post bail. 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS
3043, at 48-50. The court also compared the pretrial restraint of assets to restraints imposable by
any third party creditor. Id. at 40-42. The Nichols and Monsanto courts considered the govern-
ment's interest sufficient to justify pretrial restraint of assets. For a court to argue that the public
interest behind the CFA did not justify pretrial restraint of assets would amount "to an impermis-
sible substitution of judicial policy for Congressional policy." Monsanto, 836 F.2d at 80-81.
120. Nichols, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 3043, at 62; Monsanto, 836 F.2d at 81 (noting the
anomaly of contending that privately retained counsel is necessary for an effective defense while
arguing that the same counsel, retained from tainted funds, confers no benefit on the defendant).
121. The Nichols court held that a grand jury indictment was sufficient proof for a pretrial
restraining order. 1988 LEXIS U.S. App. 3043, at 62-63. The Monsanto court ruled that a pretrial




may penalize attorneys for accepting bona fide, tainted fees. Attorneys
seek exemption from both statutes by arguing for the constitutional
rights of defendants and the need for a vigorous adversary system. Both
statutes implicate the same constitutional rights. However, although
the criminal penalties in section 1957 are more severe than the civil
penalties of the CFA, the argument for the facial invalidity of section
1957 is weaker. Section 1957 requires the prosecution to show that an
attorney has knowledge of the illegal source of his fee to defeat the pre-
sumption of bona fide purchaser status.122 Knowledge is a considerably
higher standard than the "mere notice of forfeitability" required under
the CFA.123 Because the prosecution's burden of proof is higher under
section 1957, fewer attorneys will be threatened with prosecution, and
actual harm to a defendant's rights will occur in even fewer cases.
After Caplin & Drysdale, Nichols, and Monsanto, every circuit
court reaching the constitutional merits has upheld the facial constitu-
tionality of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984. To the extent
that these cases foreshadow future decisions, the prosecution of attor-
neys under section 1957 will pose no constitutional difficulties per se.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The potential impact of section 1957 on the adversary system and
on the quality of representation makes its application to attorneys a
legitimate subject of debate. Both the ABA and the NACDL have
called for revision of section 1957,124 and members of Congress have
indicated their willingness to consider amending the statute. 25 Empiri-
cal and anecdotal evidence indicates that prosecutorial practices involv-
ing attorneys' fee forfeiture have changed the way some defense
attorneys accept cases and handle clients. These practices include sub-
poenaing attorneys to testify about their fees, summonsing by the Inter-
nal Revenue Service, using confidential informants at defense meetings,
attempting to gain forfeiture of attorneys' fees, and trying to disqualify
an attorney who is representing a particular client.1 26
122. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 39.
125. See, e.g., Forfeiture Hearings 1987, supra note 5, at 232 (statement of Rep. McCollum).
126. See Genego, Reports from the Field: Prosecutorial Practices Compromising Effective
Criminal Defense, CHAMPION, May 1986, reprinted in Forfeiture Hearings 1986, supra note 61, at
163 [hereinafter Genego, Reports from the Field]. An abbreviated version of this article is con-
tained in Genego, Risky Business: The Hazards of Being a Criminal Defense Lawyer, CRIM. JusT.,
Spring 1986, at 3 [hereinafter Genego, Risky Business]. Ironically, § 1957 may be a defense against
prosecutorial practices that require an attorney to testify about the source of his fees. Because an
attorney may be criminally liable for knowingly accepting racketeering proceeds, an attorney may
refuse to answer questions about his fees under the fifth amendment. The fifth amendment, how-
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A 1985 survey of members of the NACDL 117 found that the attor-
neys most frequently affected by the prosecutorial practices were pri-
vate attorneys handling white collar or drug cases, attorneys who had
practiced criminal defense the longest, and attorneys who earned the
most money.1 28 Forty-six percent of those responding to the survey in-
dicated that they practiced criminal law differently as a result of these
prosecutorial practices. 2 9 Approximately thirty percent of the respon-
dents said that prosecutorial practices affected their evaluation of
whether to take certain actions on behalf of their clients, including
whether to interview witnesses for the prosecution and whether to de-
fend against government efforts to forfeit assets.130 Fourteen percent of
the respondents indicated that they had decided not to take on specific
criminal cases.'
Evidence independent of this survey confirms that at least some
attorneys practice criminal law differently in order to avoid the conse-
quences of the prosecutorial practices. This evidence shows that some
attorneys will accept a case conditioned on exemption of their fees from
forfeiture 32 or will seek to withdraw if appointed."" Some attorneys
ever, does not protect business records containing fee information. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427
U.S. 463, 477 (1976) (holding that fifth amendment protection does not encompass business
records).
127. See authorities cited supra note 126. Professor William Genego of the University of
Southern California Law Center conducted a survey of all the members of the NACDL to gauge
the effects of prosecutorial practices directed at criminal defense attorneys. The survey asked four
sets of questions. The first set requested information about the respondents' age, income, and legal
practice. The second set asked whether the respondents believed that the Department of Justice or
individual United States Attorneys' offices had adopted a practice of investigating and prosecuting
criminal defense attorneys in order to discourage the zealous representation of clients. The third
set requested information about specific prosecutorial practices against attorneys: grand jury sub-
poenas, summonses from the Internal Revenue Service, the use of confidential informants at de-
fense meetings, attempts to gain forfeiture of attorneys' fees, and efforts to disqualify an attorney
from representing a particular client. The fourth set requested information about how those prac-
tices had affected respondents' practices. Genego, Reports from the Field, supra note 126, at 164.
The survey results may not indicate the experience of all criminal defense attorneys. Members
of the NACDL may represent a group more likely to have been affected by the cited prosecutorial
practices. Id. at 164 n.5. The likelihood that an attorney was affected is even higher if the attorney
responded to the survey. Id. at 164 n.6. Despite the bias in the survey, Professor Genego believes
the results are significant. Id.
128. Genego, Reports from the Field, supra note 126, at 168; see also Genego, Risky Busi-
ness, supra note 126, at 4.
129. Genego, Reports from the Field, supra note 126, at 168; see also Genego, Risky Busi-
ness, supra note 126, at 5.
130. Genego, Reports from the Field, supra note 126, at 168; see also Genego, Risky Busi-
ness, supra note 126, at 7.
131. Genego, Reports from the Field, supra note 126, at 168; see also Genego, Risky Busi-
ness, supra note 126, at 7.
132. See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 912 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd on rehearing
sub nom. United States v. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc);
United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308, 1308-09 (D. Md. 1986); United States v. Ianniello, 644
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will refuse to take a case if forfeiture of fees is threatened."' These
prosecutorial practices also have affected the way some attorneys accept
cases. Because the source of an attorney's fee may lead to forfeiture or
the prosecution of the attorney under section 1957, at least one attor-
ney gives potential clients a Miranda-type warning.
135
In sum, prosecutorial practices have made some private criminal
defense attorneys reluctant to accept cases in which fees would be paid
from forfeitable assets. Appointed attorneys who are paid under the
Criminal Justice Act may prepare less thoroughly than if they were
paid at private rates. Finally, attorneys paid from private funds may
avoid a full investigation of their clients' cases in order to maintain
bona fide purchaser status.
To a certain extent, these results further the policy and aims of
section 1957. The drafters of section 1957 intended the statute to
render illegal money worthless and thus deprive racketeers and drug
traffickers of the fruits of their illegal enterprises.13 6 Illegally derived
money that is paid to attorneys defeats that goal by depriving the gov-
ernment of assets to which it is entitled under the Comprehensive For-
feitures Act and by providing better representation to defendants than
is constitutionally necessary."" The prosecution of attorneys may be
particularly desirable to avoid the erosion of public confidence in the
F. Supp. 452, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
133. Harvey, 814 F.2d at 912.
134. United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1987) (rehearing granted en banc).
135. One lawyer reads the following warning to potential clients:
What you tell me is going to be confidential, except all matters which deal with future crimi-
nality, except all matters which deal with fees to be paid me, and all matters which deal with
the source of the funds with which you are going to pay me. In other words, as to those areas
about which you tell me, I may end up being your prosecutor or at least a witness against you.
Forfeiture Hearings 1987, supra note 5, at 199 (statement of Bruce Lyons, President, NACDL).
136. Representative Clay Shaw articulated the purpose of § 1957 during the markup of
House Bill 5077.
I am sick and tired of watching people sit back and say, ["]I am not part of the problem, I am
not committing the crime, and, therefore, my hands are clean even though I know the money
is dirty I am handling.["] The only way we will get at this problem is to let the whole commu-
nity, the whole population, know they are part of the problem and they could very well be
convicted of it if they knowingly take these funds. If we can make the drug dealers' money
worthless, then we have really struck a chord, and we have hit him where he bruises, and that
is right in the pocketbook ***. [Y]ou have outstanding business people who are otherwise
totally moral who are accepting these funds and profiting greatly from drug trafficking that is
going on throughout this country, and this will put a stop to it.
Markup of H.R. 5077, supra note 21, at 22-23, reprinted in 132 CoNG. REc. E3821, E3828 (daily ed.
Nov. 6, 1986) (statements of Reps. McCollum and Hughes).
137. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text. While privately retained counsel is not
necessarily more able than appointed counsel, the gravamen of the arguments against § 1957 is
that a well-financed lawyer chosen by the defendant provides the best representation. See supra
notes 68-79, 82-88, 99-106 and accompanying text. The Constitution, however, only requires that a
defendant receive effective representation and a choice of lawyers he can afford.
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legal system as citizens watch the profits of drug dealing enrich attor-
neys under the claim of constitutional privilege.138
The policies advanced by section 1957, however, will not be ad-
vanced by the prosecution of all attorneys. Groups that have studied
the role of lawyers in organized crime have been careful to distinguish
between legitimate representation of a client and representation that
encourages crime. The report of the President's Commission on Organ-
ized Crime distinguished between three types of conduct by lawyers. " 9
The first and largest category encompasses the zealous, ethical repre-
sentation of witnesses and defendants in criminal cases.14 0 The second
category encompasses practices that divided an attorney's loyalty to an
individual client, such as the representation of multiple defendants and
certain third party fee arrangements.1 41 The third category encompasses
the least frequent but most harmful conduct, including subornation of
perjury, obstruction of justice, and other actions calculated to abet an
illegal enterprise. 2 Criminal lawyers in this third category, which the
Commission calls "mob-connected" 43 and "lawyer-criminals,' ' 4 4 were
the Commission's principal concern. During consideration of House Bill
5077, the Subcommittee on Crime expressed the most concern about
lawyers involved in a "growing persistent crime,'14 5 often involving
longstanding relationships with drug dealers. 4 6 Criminal liability for at-
torneys under section 1957, therefore, is most justified when lawyer-
criminals are the target. As the target widens to encompass less heinous
conduct, criminal liability becomes less justifiable and defendants' in-
terests more weighty.
138. United States v. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
Courts have expressed a similar view in cases in which attorneys have accepted stolen property or
ransom money in payment of bona fide attorneys' fees. See, e.g., Laska v. United States, 82 F.2d
672, 676-77 (10th Cir.) (convicting an attorney in part for accepting ransom money in payment of
fee), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 689 (1936); In re Chase, 119 A.D.2d 227, 228, 506 N.Y.S.2d 191, 192
(1986) (disbarring attorney for, inter alia, knowingly receiving stolen property in payment of fee);
People v. Zelinger, 179 Colo. 379, 380-81, 504 P.2d 668, 668-69 (1972) (disciplining attorney for
receiving stolen property in payment of fee and failing to investigate its source).
139. THE IMPACT, supra note 98, at 250-58.
140. Id. at 250-52.
141. Id. at 254-57. The Commission recommended revisions to the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, supra note 72, to curb this unethical conduct.
142. Id. at 257-58. The Commission recommended revisions to the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, supra note 72, and more vigorous enforcement of existing ethical canons to curb
conduct in this third category. The Commission did not specifically recommend new legislation. Id.
at 258-75.
143. Id. at 250.
144. Id. at 221.





The proposed policy of the Justice Department for prosecuting at-
torneys under section 1957 attempts to accommodate the legitimate in-
terests of defendants with those of the government. 1 7 The proposal is
reprinted in the Appendix following this Note. Under these proposed
guidelines, the Department will not prosecute attorneys for accepting a
bona fide fee for representation in a criminal matter except when there
is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the attorney had actual knowl-
edge of the fee's illegal origin. A bona fide fee is one paid without fraud
or deceit for legitimate legal representation. 14 8 A fee is not bona fide if
the fee transaction was designed to shield assets from forfeiture or to
allow the client to maintain an interest in those assets.149 Third party
payments that hinder an attorney's loyalty to his client also may not be
bona fide. 150 Under section 1957's actual knowledge standard, the Jus-
tice Department generally will not prosecute if the evidence indicates
only willful blindness. The attorney must actually have known that the
property was criminally derived. 15' Furthermore, the proposed guide-
lines prohibit the government from establishing knowledge through
confidential communications in a current matter. Nor may the govern-
ment rely on information gained by an attorney in furtherance of his
obligation to represent his client, whether gained preliminary to, or
during, representation. 52 Thus, as a practical matter, proof of knowl-
edge must be shown to have existed before representation began. 53
The Justice Department guidelines go far to accommodate defend-
ants' interests. An attorney does not risk criminal sanctions for fully
investigating his client's case because knowledge gained during repre-
sentation will not satisfy the scienter requirement. Also, the high stan-
dard of actual knowledge allows an attorney to gauge whether he risks
criminal liability prior to undertaking representation. Thus, the statute
will reach only the most culpable attorneys-those with actual knowl-
edge gained before the existing representation began. As long as the
Justice Department follows these guidelines, a defendant runs no risk
of losing his attorney once retained or of having the quality of represen-
tation compromised by the threat of criminal liability to that attorney.
The ABA and NACDL have offered revisions to the Justice De-
147. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL (draft Aug. 3, 1987) [herein-
after U.S. A'rORNEYS' MANUAL] reprinted in Appendix, infra at 870-77.
148. Id. § 9-105.410, reprinted in Appendix, infra at 875.
149. Id.
150. Id.





partment guidelines.154 These revisions would restrict prosecution to at-
torneys who knowingly and willfully contribute to the ongoing activities
of a criminal enterprise.155 In order to lessen any chilling effect on legit-
imate attorney-client relationships, the proposed revisions offer an even
stricter scienter requirement. First, the actual knowledge standard
would apply to fees earned in any legal representation, not merely to
fees earned for representation in a criminal matter. 15 Second, an attor-
ney would be under no obligation to investigate the source of his fee.
1 57
Third, an attorney would not risk prosecution if he had detailed knowl-
edge of a client's conduct, but not actual knowledge of the criminal ori-
gin of the fees."" For example, an attorney who knew that his fee was
derived from the sale of sexually explicit materials would not have
knowledge that this fee came from the sale of obscenity, unless a jury
had made that determination already by applying community stan-
dards.159 Receipt of fees derived from other offenses requiring the sub-
jective judgments of a jury, such as fraud or misleading conduct,
similarly would not support prosecution. 60 Finally, evidence of an at-
torney's knowledge would have to be derived from a third party, not
from the attorney himself.161 In order to ensure that these guidelines
are followed, the revisions would require that a target attorney be given
a hearing prior to indictment before the Assistant Attorney General of
the Criminal Division.6 2
The ABA and NACDL revisions do not fully allay the bar's con-
cerns."6 The Justice Department guidelines do not bind the Depart-
ment and confer no rights on defendants.6 Furthermore, they
contemplate prosecution on a willful blindness theory in "extraordinary
cases" 165 and allow the use of client communications when other evi-
154. For the text of Guidelines on Section 1957, see Letter, supra note 39 (showing suggested
amendments).
155. Letter, supra note 39, at 3.
156. Id. at 7.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 8.
159. Id.
160. Id. This revision appears to clarify rather than modify the scienter requirement of
§ 1957. Under § 1957, a defendant risks conviction only if he knows that the property he received
was criminally derived. If that determination can be made only by a jury applying "community
standards," an attorney cannot be charged with knowledge of the criminal derivation of the
property.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 3.
163. See supra note 39.
164. U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 147, § 9-105.500, reprinted in Appendix, infra at
877.
165. Id. § 9-105.420, reprinted in Appendix, infra at 876.
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dence establishes that the attorney had actual knowledge.1 6  Therefore,
the chilling effect of section 1957 remains to the extent that an attorney
distrusts the good offices of the Justice Department.
VI. RECOMMENDATION
Neither the proposed Justice Department guidelines nor the ABA-
NACDL proposals strike an appropriate balance between the aims of
section 1957 and the aims of a zealous adversary system. The ABA-
NACDL proposals would still permit racketeers to retain the benefits of
high priced lawyers, would still deprive the government of money to
which it is statutorily entitled, and would still pose risks to public confi-
dence in the judicial system. The ABA-NACDL proposals also would
overvalue the needs of civil defendants. A vigorous adversary system
and well-prepared defense counsel are needed most in criminal matters
in which a client's life or liberty is at stake.1 6 7 That argument is far less
weighty when a client seeks representation in a civil matter.
The ABA-NACDL proposals, however, highlight problems with the
Justice Department guidelines and with section 1957. For example, an
attorney considering whether to accept a client may be unsure whether
to investigate the source of his fee and, if so, how far that investigation
should go. He also may be unsure of the Justice Department's willing-
ness to follow its prosecutive policies. In short, an attorney now faces a
host of uncertainties that may deter him from taking a case or from
fully investigating it.
Congress can reduce the uncertainty inherent in the Justice De-
partment draft guidelines by amending the scienter requirement in sec-
tion 1957.1e8 The amendment should discount knowledge gained
166. Id. § 9-105.430, reprinted in Appendix, infra at 877.
167. The United States Constitution requires the effective assistance of counsel only in crim-
inal matters. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
168. Congress and the Justice Department have resisted a statutory exemption for attorney
conduct because it might open the door to exceptions for other interest groups. 132 CONG. REc.
E3821, E3828 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1986) (statements of Reps. McCollum and Hughes); Letter, supra
note 39. Congress expressed concern over the potential liability of doctors who are paid with
tainted money, and the NACDL has shown concern for priests who receive tainted donations and
colleges that receive tainted tuition payments. Forfeiture Hearings 1987, supra note 5, at 220;
Wallace, supra note 17, at 11. Each of these parties may, by virtue of their relationship with the
racketeer, know the source of the racketeer's income. Several factors make a statutory exemption
for these groups unnecessary. First, the statute itself limits prosecution to persons with knowledge
who have received and deposited more than $10,000. Practical limitations make prosecution partic-
ularly difficult because the fifth amendment and privileges under Federal Rule of Evidence 501
may foreclose testimony from the defendant. Second, a prosecutor may exercise his discretion and
not prosecute in sympathetic cases, or he may pursue the lesser penalty of forfeiture under the
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act. See supra note 38. Finally, the interests of defendants and of a




preliminary to or during representation of a then existing criminal mat-
ter. Amended in this fashion, section 1957 would expose to criminal lia-
bility only attorneys whose knowledge of a client's criminal activities
was gained before representation. This effect would be desirable be-
cause it would prevent the formation of an unseemly alliance between
an attorney and drug dealer, reducing the threat to public confidence in
the judicial system and the recruitment of mob-connected lawyers. All
other attorneys could undertake representation without risking a con-
flict of interest, without risking prosecution for fully investigating the
client's case, and without fearing that the Justice Department might
abrogate its guidelines.
This amendment still would leave uncertain how far an attorney
should investigate a potential client. Attorneys, however, already are
under a duty in certain contexts to investigate their clients prior to un-
dertaking representation. For example, attorneys have an explicit ethi-
cal duty to investigate whether they are being paid with stolen
property,169 in addition to an implied duty to inquire whether the client
is seeking advice in furtherance of a crime.170 A lawyer also may investi-
gate the client simply to determine whether the client can pay the at-
torney's fee. In any case, the duty would be no more onerous than for
ordinary citizens. Justice Department guidelines and ad hoc solutions
by courts would guard against prosecutorial excesses.
Underlying the opposition to section 1957 is the belief that no pub-
lic consensus exists about the morality of knowingly receiving illegally
derived money and the concern that the statute subjects innocent peo-
ple to criminal liability.1 11 Congress should reject this argument. A pub-
lic consensus already exists about the immorality of receiving stolen
property, 72 and a consensus is emerging about the immorality of using
proceeds from criminal activities. 73 The proposed amendment to sec-
169. People v. Zelinger, 179 Colo. 379, 504 P.2d 668 (1982). The duty to investigate generally
may be inferred from statutes proscribing the receipt of stolen property.
170. In re Wines, 370 S.W.2d 328 (Mo. 1963) (suspending a lawyer who acted on false infor-
mation supplied by client without investigation); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Respon-
sibility, Informal Op. 1470 (1981). "A lawyer should not undertake representation without making
further inquiry if the facts presented by a prospective client suggest that the representation might
aid the client in perpetuating a fraud or otherwise committing crime." Id.
171. See, e.g., Forfeiture Hearings 1987, supra note 5, at 221 (statement by Bruce Lyons,
President, NACDL) (citing refusal by Republican National Committee to return illegally derived
money because the Committee had "done nothing wrong"); Letter, supra note 39 (stating that
"honest and ethical" attorneys may be subject to liability for the "legitimate" representation of a
client).
172. See supra notes 6 & 138 and accompanying text.
173. Arizona recently adopted a money laundering statute making it a crime to receive racke-
teering proceeds with knowledge or reason to know that they were the proceeds of an offense. ARiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2317(A) (Supp. 1987). California also recently adopted a money laundering
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tion 1957 would develop this consensus further by drawing a bright line
between ethical representation of a client and representation that en-
courages crime at the expense of the public weal.
Paul G. Wolfteich
statute that makes it a crime to conduct a transaction knowing the money is the proceeds of or is
derived from criminal activity. The statute, however, makes special provision for attorneys who
receive tainted money in payment of a fee earned from representation in a criminal proceeding. In
that case, the statute requires evidence that the attorney possessed a criminal intent to disguise
the source of the funds or the nature of the criminal activity. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.10(a) (West
Supp. 1988). Twelve states proscribe the knowing receipt of proceeds derived from racketeering
activity that are then used to acquire an interest in an enterprise or in real property. See COLO.
REV. STAT. § 18-17-104(1)(a) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-395(a) (West 1985); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 895.03 (1) (West Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-6-2(a)(1) (Burns 1985); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 15:1353(a) (West Supp. 1987); MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-43-5 (1) (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
207.400(1) (Michie 1986); On. REv. STAT. § 166.720(1) (1985); R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-15-2(a) (1985);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1-1004(a) (Supp. 1987); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.82.080(1) (1988); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 946.83 (1) (West Supp. 1987). Two states have similar statutes, but the legislative
intent behind them would limit prosecution to cases in which there is an interrelated pattern of
criminal activity. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-14-2(b), 16-14-4(a) (1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75D-2(c),
75D-4 (1986). Six states limit prosecution to persons who have participated in the underlying of-
fense. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1503(c) (1987); IDAHO CODE § 18-7804(a) (Supp. 1987); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-42-4(a) (1987); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.25(1) (McKinney Supp. 1988); 18 PA. CoNs.
STAT. ANN. § 911(b) (1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1603(1) (Supp. 1987).
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9-105.000 - POLICY WITH REGARD TO PROSECUTIONS UNDER 18 U.S.C.
§ 1957
Section 1957 creates an offense entitled "engaging in
monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful
activity." The elements of this offense are: (1) an individual
must "knowingly" engage or attempt to engage in a "monetary
transaction" in "criminally derived property"; (2) "the value of
the property must be greater than $10,000"; and (3) the
criminally derived property must be derived from certain
"specified unlawful activity."
9-105.100 - Division Approval
Approval by the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal
Division is required before indictment for all prosecutions under
18 USC §1957 if the potential defendant is an attorney and the
criminally derived property is or purports to be attorneys' fees
paid to the attorney for providing representation to a client in
a criminal or civil matter. Such approval shall be given in
accordance with the prosecution policies set forth in Sections
9-105.300 and 9-105.400.
9-105.200 - "Knowingly" as an Element of Proof in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1957 Prosecutions
Although subsection 1957 (a) requires proof that the
property involved is in fact derived from "specified unlawful
activity," subsection 1957 (c) specifically states that "the
government is not required to prove the defendant knew that the
offense from which the criminally derived property was derived
was specified unlawful activity." Thus, Section 1957 requires
proof only that the defendant knew the property came from some
illegal activity, whether it be a felony or misdemeanor ofrhne.
A defendant may be proven to have knowledge that property is
criminally derived by proof that he either (1) knows that the
property is criminally derived or (2) is willfully blind to this
fact -- i.e., he has his suspicions definitely aroused and
refuses Fo-investigate for fear he will discover that the
property is criminally derived. See, e.g., United States v.
Jewell, 52) F. 2d 697 (9th Cir.)(en banc) cert. denied, 426 U.S.
951(976).
The relevant time for determining whether the requisite
knowledge exists is the time at which the individual engages in a
transaction within the ambit of Section 1957. Lack of knowledge
at the time of the property's receipt is not critical if there is
a gap between the receipt of the property and the monetary
transaction. Thus, if property is received without knowledge of
its criminal derivation, but the individual subsequently gains
knowledge of its criminal origin before engaging in a monetary
transaction, he can be held liable.
-3 -
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In evaluating whether a defendant actually knew or was
willfully blind to the fact that the property was criminally
derived, all of the circumstances surrounding the receipt or
transfer of the property should be considered. In most cases it
is expected that there will be evidence that the defendant was
told of the source of the property either by the person who gave
it to him or by some third party. However, such evidence is not
always required. The following list, though not intended to be
all-inclusive, is representative of the type of behavior which,
alone or in combination, may support a decision to investigate or
prosecute:
(1) Acceptance of a commission when general
industry practice does not provide for
commissions.
(2) Acceptance of a commission above market
rates.
(3) Use of false names to purchase goods and/
or services.
(4) Numerous and unjustified transfers of
title to others or sham transfers of title.
(5) Failure to provide accurate identification
or use of suspicious identification.
(6) Use of cash in large denominations.
(7) Knowledge that legitimate livelihood
of purchaser is insufficient to allow
purchaser to afford the goods and/or
services to be purchased.
(8) Grossly inadequate or grossly inflated
purchase/sale price.
(9) Seller's obligation to break or bend
company rules to consummate the deal.
stp (10) Conducting business under odd circum-
stances, at irregular hours, or in
unusual locations by industry standards.
9-105.300 - General Prosecution Standards
With respect to transactions between possessors of crimi-
nally derived property and sellers of goods and/or services,
other than attorneys who receive such property as bona fide fees
for representation in a criminal matter, a prosecution Tor
violation of Section 1957 may be instituted if there is evidence
to establish that the defendant had actual knowledge of the
illegal origin of the property or that the defendant was
-4-
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"willfully blind" to such fact. In sum, such persons should be
accorded no special consideration and may be prosecuted to the
full extent allowed under the statutes. Of course, there must be
sufficient evidence to prove the actual knowledge or willful
blindness beyond a reasonable doubt.
9-105.400 - Prosecution Standards - Bona Fide Fees Paid to
Attorneys for Representation in a Criminal Matter
There is no statutory prohibition upon the application of
Section 1957 to transactions involving bona fide fees paid to
attorneys for representation in a criminal matter. However, the
Department recognizes that attorneys in such situations, unlike
all others who may deal with criminal defendants, may be required
to investigate and pursue matters which will provide them with
knowledge of the illicit source of the property they receive.
Indeed, the failure to investigate such matters may be a breach
of ethical standards or may result in a lack of effective
assistance to the client.
Because the Department firmly believes that attorneys
representing clients in criminal matters must not be hampered in
their ability to effectively and ethically represent their
clients within the bounds of the law, the Department, as a matter
of policy, will not prosecute attorneys under Section 1957 based
upon the receipt of property constituting bona fide fees for the
legitimate representation in a criminal matter, except if (1)
there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the attorney had
actual knowledae of the illegal origin of the specific property
received and (2) such evidence does not consist of confidential
communications made by the client preinminary to or during
representation in a criminal matter or other information obtained
by the attorney preliminary to or during the representation and
in furtherance of the obligation to effectively represent the
client.
What constitutes "representation in a criminal matter"
depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
In deciding if representation in different proceedings
constitutes representation in a single matter, consideration will
be given to whether all of the proceedings relate to
investigations of cases arising out of or based upon the same
facts or transactions.
This prosecution standard only applies to fees received for
legal representation in a criminal matter. Attorneys who receive
criminally derived property in exchange for carrying out or
engaging in other commercial transactions unrelated to the
representation of a client in a criminal matter or for
representing a client in a civil matter should be treated the
same as any other person under the policy in § 9-105.300.
Proper application of this policy requires examination of
three issues: (1) what constitutes bona fide fees; (2) what
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constitutes actual knowledge; and (3) what evidence may be relied
upon to meet the knowledge requirement of the policy.
9-105.410 - Bona Fide Fees
The first question which will have to be answered to
determine if this prosecution standard applies, is whether the
fee paid was a bona fide fee for representation in a criminal
matter. This question will have to be answered on a case-by-case
basis; however, the fundamental inquiry is whether the fee was
paid in good faith without fraud or deceit for representation
concerning the defendant's personal criminal liability. Thus,
for example, if a defendant's legal fees are paid by another in
an effort to protect that other person's identity or legal
interests or any other interests of the overall criminal venture,
such payments may not be bona fide.
However, fee payments by third parties, standing alone, do
not create any presumption of lack of bona fides, so long as the
attorney's loyalty and obligation remainto t he client and the
third-party payment does not create any conflicting obligation to
the payor.
Similarly, if there is a reasonable basis to believe that
the fee transaction was a fraudulent or sham transaction designed
to shield the property from forfeiture, hide its existence from
governmental investigative agencies, or was conducted for any
purpose other than for legitimate legal representation, the fee
would not be bona fide. Generally, a transaction is a sham or
fraud if there is evidence that a scheme or plan existed to
maintain the client's or any other person's or corporation's
interest in the asset or the ability to use it beneficially.
This may be established, for example, by proof that the value of
the property transferred far exceeded the value of the services
rendered and that there was an agreement by the attorney to
transfer the asset or some portion of it back to the client, a
third party or any other legal entity. There need not be proof
that the attorney was a participant in the criminal activity
giving rise to the property or that he otherwise violated the
law. Quite obviously, however, proof that an attorney knowingly
acted in a manner as to afd and abet or serve as an accessory
after the fact to a money laundering transaction or otherwise to
facilitate criminal conduct would lead to the conclusion that the
property was not a bona fide fee.
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9-105.420 - Actual Knowledge as Applied to Bona Fide Fees
As applied to bona fide fees received for representation in
a criminal matter, the Department's policy precludes prosecution
if there is evidence only of willful blindness. Thus, prosecution
may not be commenced if it is only established that the attorney
consciously avoided learning the true nature of the property.
The existence of actual knowledge will have to be determined
on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration all the facts
and circumstances. However, prosecutors seeking to prosecute
attorneys for violations of Section 1957 based on monetary
transactions arising from the payment of bona fide fees for
representation in a criminal matter must be very circumspect in
seeking authority to proceed. Prosecutors must first possess
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the specific property
involved in the monetary transaction was criminally derived.
Second, there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the
attorney actually knew this to be true and, as discussed below,
that this now edge was derived from information known to the
attorney from outside the relationship.
Because this actual knowledge requirement is a matter of
policy and not a statutory mandate, proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of "willful blindness" will suffice to sustain a
conviction. In other words, while the government will not
undertake a prosecution except if it believes that there is proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of actual knowledge, the government is
not precluded from relying on a "willful blindness" instruction
at trial. However, it is expected that this will only occur in
extraordinary cases, and that cases normally will be submitted to
the trier of fact on an actual knowledge theory.
9-105.430 - Evidence of Actual Knowledze
Another aspect of the Department's policy is that the actual
knowledge predicate must be based on evidence other than
confidential communications made by the client preli n-ary to or
during representation on the matter or other information obtained
by the attorney preliminary to or during the representation and
in furtherance of the obligation to effectively represent the
client. This policy means that evidence that the attorney
learned from the client during the course of the representation
that the fee was paid from an illegitimate source may not be
relied upon to establish actual knowledge. For example, a
client's voluntary testimony at trial or a client's voluntary
disclosure of communications with his or her attorney --
discussed in an attempt to "make a deal" by implicating the
attorney in criminal misconduct -- may not be used to meet the
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policy requirement of actual knowledge. ./ However, if there is
other evidence that establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that
the attorney had actual knowledge, client communications may be
used at trial to prove the requisite knowledge.
As a practical matter, this limitation means that in most
cases there will be proof beyond a reasonable doubt of actual
knowledge that pre-existed representation on the particular
matter or that was gained independent of the attorney - client
relationship on that matter. For example, if any attorney is
functioning as "in house" counsel for a criminal enterprise and
knows from personal observation or non-privileged communication
with the criminal entrepreneurs that certain money is criminally
derived, then the subsequent payment of legal fees to that
attorney for legal representation on a particular criminal matter
may be subject to prosecution.
This limitation upon the type of evidence that may be relied
upon to meet the policy requirement of actual knowledge is
imposed as a matter of policy. It is imposed to insure that
attorneys representing criminal clients will have no incentive to
avoid fully investigating the activities of the client relating
to the criminal investigation or prosecution and thus will be
able to provide adequate and effective representation.
9-105.500 - Prohibition on Giving Notice of the Criminal
Derivation of Property
No Department attorney shall either orally or in writing
inform an attorney who is legitimately representihg a client in a
criminal case that the property the attorney is receiving is or
may be criminally derived solely for purposes of meeting the
requirements of knowledge imposed by this prosecution policy or
by the statute.
This Policy statement is not intended to create or confer
any rights, privileges, or benefits on prospective or actual
witnesses or defendants. It is also not intended to have the
force of law or of a United States Department of Justice
directive. See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
1/ This standard is separate from that set forth for forfeiture
of a fee under § 9-111.000.
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